Beyond Rules: Why Care Ethics Matter in an Impersonal World
Carol Gilligan's groundbreaking work recognizes that true moral maturity involves understanding the specific needs of particular people in their unique circumstances, not just fairness or impartiality
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In a world increasingly driven by algorithms, efficiency metrics, and universal protocols, we're witnessing a profound crisis of connection. Our institutions champion impartiality and standardization while our souls crave recognition, empathy, and care. This tension isn't just a modern dilemma—it's a philosophical battleground that's been raging for decades.
A recent episode of Heliox dives deep into Lawrence A. Blum's 1988 analysis of Carol Gilligan and Lawrence Kohlberg's competing visions of morality. While this might sound like abstract academic territory, the implications couldn't be more relevant to our daily lives and the social fractures we're experiencing today.
The Moral Map We've Been Following
For generations, Western moral philosophy has been dominated by what we might call "rulebook ethics." This approach, championed by Kohlberg and deeply rooted in traditions like Kantianism and utilitarianism, frames morality as essentially about applying universal principles impartially. Be fair. Maximize happiness. Treat everyone equally. Follow the categorical imperative.
There's something clean and reassuring about this framework. It promises objectivity and clarity—a moral GPS that works regardless of who you are or where you're going. It's the ethical equivalent of saying, "Just follow the manual and you'll be fine."
But if you've ever tried to navigate complex human relationships with only a rulebook, you know something crucial gets lost.
The Missing Piece: A Different Voice
Carol Gilligan's groundbreaking work identified this missing element. Through her research with women (though not exclusively), she uncovered a different moral orientation—one centered on care, connection, and context rather than abstract principles.
This "ethics of care" doesn't reject fairness or impartiality outright. Rather, it recognizes that true moral maturity involves something more nuanced: understanding the specific needs of particular people in their unique circumstances.
Think about it: If your closest friend is going through a crisis, they don't need you to apply some universal ethical algorithm. They need you to show up as you—with all your history, understanding, and connection to them specifically. They need your care, not just your fairness.
Seven Critical Differences
Blum's analysis identifies seven key distinctions between these approaches:
The Situated Self: We make moral decisions not as abstract rational agents but as embedded individuals with specific histories, relationships, and contexts.
Particular Others: Care ethics focuses on responding to the specific needs of real people, not abstract "generalized others."
Hard-Won Knowledge: Understanding others takes effort—real moral work that involves listening, empathy, and attention.
Connection Before Independence: We enter the world already tied to others, not as autonomous individuals who later choose to form bonds.
Emotions as Moral Guides: Our feelings aren't distractions from moral reasoning but essential components of it.
Beyond Universal Principles: What's right in one context might not be universalizable to all situations.
Relationships Generate Obligations: Our connections to others create genuine moral responsibilities that don't derive from abstract principles.
These aren't minor tweaks to conventional morality—they represent a fundamentally different understanding of what it means to be good.
Why This Matters Now
Let's be honest: our society is fracturing. Despite unprecedented technological connectivity, loneliness has reached epidemic proportions. Our institutions prioritize efficiency and standardization while human beings starve for recognition and care.
The healthcare system processes "cases" instead of caring for people. Education systems teach to standardized tests rather than nurturing individual minds. Social media algorithms feed us content based on engagement metrics rather than meaningful connection.
We've built systems that excel at impartiality but fail at care.
This isn't just making us miserable—it's fueling our deepest societal divisions. When people feel reduced to abstractions rather than seen as individuals, resentment festers. When care is treated as optional rather than essential, trust erodes.
The False Hierarchy
Defenders of traditional ethics often try to relegate care to a secondary status. They argue that while care might be nice, it's merely "supererogatory"—going beyond the call of duty rather than being duty itself.
But as Blum powerfully argues, this misses the point entirely. The care we show to those in our immediate circles isn't just a bonus feature of morality—it's woven into the very fabric of what it means to live a moral life.
Consider the parent who comforts a frightened child at 3 AM. The friend who drops everything to support someone in crisis. The neighbor who checks in on an elderly person during a heatwave. These actions often fall outside any strict definition of universal "duty," yet they're absolutely essential to what we recognize as moral goodness.
These aren't just nice additions to morality—they are morality at its most fundamental.
Beyond the Personal
The implications extend far beyond our personal relationships. What would our politics look like if we recognized care as essential to morality rather than optional? How might we redesign healthcare, education, and social services if we saw care and attention to particularity as moral requirements rather than inefficiencies to be eliminated?
What if we stopped trying to make care fit into existing frameworks of impartiality and instead recognized that sometimes the most moral response isn't to treat everyone the same?
This doesn't mean abandoning impartiality altogether—fairness and justice remain essential. But it does mean expanding our moral vision to recognize that care isn't just "being nice"—it's doing what's right.
The Path Forward
The beauty of this philosophical reframing is that it validates what many of us already intuitively feel: that morality isn't just about following rules but about responding to others with attention, empathy, and care.
This isn't some radical new invention—it's a recovery of wisdom that's been marginalized in our dominant ethical frameworks. It's about embracing the complexity of moral life rather than reducing it to algorithms and universal formulas.
And it starts with small, everyday choices:
Truly listening to someone instead of just waiting to speak
Asking what a particular person needs rather than assuming
Recognizing that emotions provide vital moral information
Understanding that our relationships generate real moral obligations
Seeing moral growth as developing capacities for empathy and responsiveness, not just learning rules
These may seem like small shifts, but they represent a profound reorientation of what we value and how we understand goodness.
In a world increasingly designed around impartiality, efficiency, and universal protocols, championing care isn't just nice—it's necessary. It's not about rejecting impartiality but about recognizing that both care and justice are essential elements of a fully realized moral life.
The conversation between these moral voices—between care and justice, between attention to particularity and commitment to universal principles—isn't one we'll ever definitively resolve. But engaging in this dialogue might just help us repair some of the fractures in our increasingly disconnected world.
Because sometimes the most revolutionary act isn't finding new answers, but asking better questions about what truly matters.
Gilligan and Kohlberg: Implications for Moral Theory
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STUDY MATERIALS
1. Briefing Document
Executive Summary:
This briefing document reviews Lawrence Blum's analysis of Carol Gilligan's critique of Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of moral development and the broader implications for moral philosophy. Blum highlights Gilligan's claim for a distinct "care orientation" in morality, contrasting it with Kohlberg's "impartialist conception" rooted in justice, universal principles, and formal rationality. The document outlines key differences between these perspectives and examines various potential impartialist rejoinders to Gilligan's work, ultimately arguing that a morality of care, emphasizing relationships, particularity, and emotional responsiveness, constitutes a significant and irreducible element of moral life that cannot be fully subsumed under impartialist frameworks.
Main Themes and Important Ideas/Facts:
1. Gilligan's Critique of Impartialist Morality:
Gilligan argues for the empirical existence of a moral outlook distinct from impartiality, impersonality, justice, formal rationality, and universal principles. Blum terms this contrasting view the "impartialist conception of morality," which he identifies as dominant in contemporary Anglo-American moral philosophy and central to Kohlberg's theory.
Gilligan's work suggests that "care and responsibility within personal relationships constitute an important element of morality itself, genuinely distinct from impartiality."
This "different voice" emphasizes attention to, understanding of, and emotional responsiveness toward individuals within a web of ongoing relationships. While Gilligan intends this to extend to all human beings, her empirical work often focuses on personal relations.
Blum notes that Gilligan does not intend for care to replace impartiality but rather envisions a "final mature morality involves a complex interaction and dialogue between the concerns of impartiality and those of personal relationship and care."
2. Seven Key Differences Between Gilligan's and Kohlberg's Views:
Blum identifies seven key contrasts:
The Moral Self: Gilligan sees it as "radically situated and particularized," defined by connections and relationships ("thick"). Kohlberg advocates for an impersonal standpoint ("thin"). Blum quotes Gilligan's perspective: "For Gilligan, care morality is about the particular agent's caring for and about the particular friend or child with whom she has come to have this particular relationship. Morality is not (only) about how the impersonal 'one' is meant to act toward the impersonal 'other.'"
The Other: For Gilligan, the person toward whom one acts is also radically particular, requiring understanding as a specific individual, not just an instantiation of general moral categories. Kohlberg views the moral significance of others as bearers of general and repeatable characteristics.
Moral Knowledge: Gilligan (aligning with Iris Murdoch) believes achieving knowledge of the particular other requires "specifically moral capacities" like care, love, empathy, compassion, and emotional sensitivity. Kohlberg implies this knowledge is a straightforwardly empirical matter.
The Self and Relationships: Gilligan emphasizes an "encumbered" self, bound by pre-existing ties and relationships, contrasting with Kohlberg's Kantian view of a radically autonomous individual legislating principles from within.
Role of Emotion: Kohlberg prioritizes formal rationality in moral reasoning, with emotions playing a secondary role. Gilligan sees morality as an "intertwining of emotion, cognition, and action."
Universality of Principles: Kohlberg emphasizes universalistic principles. Gilligan rejects the notion that an action appropriate to one individual must be universalizable, favoring a wider notion of "appropriate response" guided by the nonsubjective standards of care and responsibility in the particular case.
Foundation of Morality: Gilligan posits that morality is founded in a "sense of concrete connection and direct response between persons," preceding abstract principles. Kohlberg sees the ultimate moral concern as adherence to morally right action and principle, mediating responsiveness to others.
3. Impartialist Rebuttals to Gilligan:
Blum outlines eight potential impartialist responses to Gilligan's challenge, ranging from denying the distinctiveness of care to acknowledging its moral significance but deeming it secondary or ultimately justifiable by impartial principles. He focuses particularly on the following:
Position 1: Denies that care is a distinct moral orientation, claiming it's ultimately based on universalizable principles derived impartially. Blum argues against this by stating that applying seemingly universal principles in personal relationships requires moral capacities like care and sensitivity to particular individuals and situations, which go beyond the principles themselves.
Position 2: Claims that care in relationships is personal, not moral. Blum counters that if "moral" is defined solely by impartiality, it arbitrarily excludes necessary conditions of responsible action within relationships.
Position 3: Acknowledges care as moral but secondary to impartiality (e.g., as supererogatory). Blum questions the implications of "supererogatory," arguing that many caring actions are obligatory, and even those beyond duty can be highly significant.
Position 4: Views care as an inferior form of morality because it's not grounded in universal principle. Blum argues that actions stemming from principle alone may not fulfill the relational expectations that caring actions do, particularly in expressing appropriate emotions.
Position 6: Sees impartialist right as setting side constraints on care. Blum argues that in many situations devoid of impartial demands, care becomes the more significant consideration, thus challenging the inherent superiority of impartiality.
4. The Moral Value of Care:
Blum argues that acting from care involves more than just applying universal principles. It requires "qualities of character and sensibilities which are themselves moral and which go beyond the straightforward process of consulting a principle."
He uses the example of a parent protecting a child to illustrate that recognizing when a principle applies and how to apply it effectively often necessitates "concerned and caring understanding of a particular child."
Blum suggests that "both universality and particularistic care play a role in morally responsible action within personal relationships," supporting Gilligan's view that care is a significant and distinct moral consideration alongside impartiality.
5. Is Care a Universal Principle?
Blum addresses the objection that care itself could be seen as a universal principle ("Be responsible within one's particular relationships"). He concedes that a morality of care is meant to be for all in an important sense (not relativistic).
However, he argues that framing care as a "universal principle" in this way moves away from the core contrast with impartialist morality, as it acknowledges the necessity of emotional response and care for particular persons, which cannot be fully codified into abstract principles.
Implications for Moral Theory:
Blum concludes that Gilligan's work raises fundamental questions for moral philosophy, suggesting the need to incorporate a distinct moral orientation of care into theoretical frameworks.
He argues that care is not merely a secondary or derivative aspect of morality but holds intrinsic moral value and plays a crucial role in responsible action, particularly within personal relationships.
The paper suggests that a comprehensive understanding of moral maturity and excellence requires going beyond the dichotomy of care and impartiality to encompass other moral phenomena.
Quotes:
"Gilligan claims empirical support for the existence of a moral outlook or orientation distinct from one based on impartiality, impersonality, justice, formal rationality, and universal principle."
"By contrast Gilligan argues-drawing on the conceptions of morality held by many of her largely (but by no means exclusively) female respondents-that care and responsibility within personal relationships constitute an important element of morality itself, genuinely distinct from impartiality."
"For Gilligan the moral self is radically situated and particularized. It is 'thick' rather than 'thin,' defined by its historical connections and relationships."
"For Gilligan, not only is the self radically particularized, but so is the other, the person toward whom one is acting and with whom one stands in some relationship. The moral agent must understand the other person as the specific individual that he or she is..."
"For Kohlberg principles of right action are universalistic, applicable to all. Gilligan rejects the notion that an action appropriate to a given individual is necessarily (or needs to be regarded by the agent as) universal, or generalizable to others."
"For Gilligan morality is founded in a sense of concrete connection and direct response between persons, a direct sense of connection which exists prior to moral beliefs about what is right or wrong or which principles to accept."
"Gilligan does not suggest that care and responsibility are to be seen either as replacing impartiality as a basis of morality or as encompassing all of morality... Rather, Gilligan holds that there is an appropriate place for impartiality, universal principle, and the like within morality and that a final mature morality involves a complex interaction and dialogue between the concerns of impartiality and those of personal relationship and care."
Conclusion:
Blum's analysis underscores the significant challenge Gilligan's work poses to traditional impartialist moral theories. By meticulously outlining the differences between the care and justice orientations and critically examining various impartialist counterarguments, Blum makes a compelling case for recognizing the distinct and vital role of care, relationships, and particularity within the moral domain. This briefing highlights the need for moral philosophy to move beyond a singular focus on impartial principles and incorporate the insights offered by Gilligan's perspective to achieve a more comprehensive and nuanced understanding of moral experience.
2. Quiz & Answer Key
I. Key Concepts and Arguments
Impartialist Conception of Morality: Understand the core tenets of this view, including its emphasis on impartiality, impersonality, justice, formal rationality, and universal principles. Identify philosophers associated with this conception (e.g., Kant, some utilitarians, Kohlberg).
Gilligan's Critique: Articulate Gilligan's central argument that there exists a distinct moral orientation focused on care and responsibility within personal relationships, challenging the dominance of the impartialist view.
"Different Voice": Explain what Gilligan means by this term and how it contrasts with the justice-oriented framework she attributes to Kohlberg's research, particularly in its focus on interconnectedness and responsiveness.
Particularity vs. Universality: Analyze the fundamental difference between Gilligan's emphasis on the particularity of the self, the other, and the situation in moral decision-making, and Kohlberg's focus on universalizable principles.
Care Ethics: Define the central characteristics of this ethical approach, including its focus on relationships, empathy, compassion, and the understanding of individual needs and contexts.
Kohlberg's Stages of Moral Development: While the source focuses on the contrast, a basic understanding of Kohlberg's framework (pre-conventional, conventional, post-conventional) is helpful to grasp Gilligan's initial challenge.
Encumbered vs. Autonomous Self: Explain the distinction between Gilligan's view of the moral self as embedded in relationships and Kohlberg's (and Kant's) emphasis on the autonomous, rational individual legislating moral principles.
Role of Emotion and Cognition: Compare how Kohlberg and Gilligan view the interplay of emotion and cognition in moral reasoning and action.
Universalizability of Care: Consider whether care ethics implies universal principles, and if so, how these might differ from the universal principles of justice-based ethics.
Impartialist Rejoinders: Understand the various ways in which proponents of impartialist morality might respond to Gilligan's critique, as outlined in the eight alternative positions.
II. Key Contrasts Between Gilligan and Kohlberg
Moral Self: Situated and particularized vs. abstract and impersonal.
Moral Other: Understood as a specific individual vs. as an instantiation of general moral categories.
Moral Task: Achieving knowledge of the particular other through care vs. applying universal principles.
Nature of Self: Encumbered by relationships vs. radically autonomous.
Role of Emotion: Integral and intertwined with cognition vs. secondary to formal rationality.
Principles: Context-dependent and focused on appropriate response vs. universalistic and focused on right action.
Moral Foundation: Concrete connection and direct response vs. adherence to abstract principles.
III. Evaluating Impartialist Responses
Critically analyze the eight positions outlined in the text that represent impartialist responses to Gilligan's work.
Pay close attention to the arguments against Positions 1 and 2, which deny the distinct moral significance of care.
Understand the distinctions between seeing care as non-moral (Position 2), secondary to justice (Position 3), or a less mature form of morality (Position 4).
Consider the implications of viewing care as relating to the evaluation of persons while impartiality relates to acts (Position 5).
Analyze the "side-constraint" view (Position 6) and the argument that impartial justification underlies care (Position 7).
Reflect on why Kohlberg's idea of "integration" (Position 8) is ultimately viewed as prioritizing justice in the context of this paper.
IV. Connections to Broader Ethical Theory
Consider how Gilligan's work relates to the debate between virtue ethics and Kantian/utilitarian ethics.
Understand the author's point that care ethics, while sharing some concerns with virtue ethics, is not entirely encompassed by it.
Reflect on the suggestion that morality might encompass more than just care and impartiality (e.g., community, honesty, courage).
Quiz
According to Blum, what are the key characteristics of the "impartialist conception of morality" that Gilligan challenges?
Explain Gilligan's central claim about the existence of a "different voice" in moral development. How does this perspective differ from Kohlberg's focus?
Describe the contrast between Gilligan's view of the moral self as "radically situated" and Kohlberg's emphasis on achieving an "impersonal standpoint."
Why does Blum argue that achieving knowledge of the particular other person is a complex moral task, drawing on concepts from Iris Murdoch?
Explain Gilligan's concept of the "encumbered self" and how it contrasts with Kohlberg's Kantian view of the autonomous moral agent.
Summarize Position 1, one of the impartialist rejoinders to Gilligan, and explain Blum's primary criticism of this position.
Describe Position 2, another impartialist rejoinder, and explain why Blum argues against relegating concerns with relationships to a purely "personal" domain.
According to Blum's analysis, what are some of the different ways Kohlberg attempts to position care in relation to impartialist morality (refer to at least two of Position 3's sub-points)?
Explain why Blum finds the view that care is "supererogatory" problematic as a way to diminish the significance of care ethics.
According to Blum, why might actions stemming from care be considered morally richer or more complete in personal relationships than identical actions motivated solely by impartial principles?
Answer Key
The impartialist conception of morality emphasizes principles based on impartiality, impersonality, justice, formal rationality, and universality. It views morality as arising from an objective standpoint, detached from personal feelings and particular relationships, and is often associated with philosophers like Kant and proponents of certain forms of utilitarianism.
Gilligan claims that there is a distinct moral outlook, often prevalent in women's moral reasoning, that prioritizes care, responsibility, and the maintenance of relationships over abstract principles of justice. This "different voice" focuses on understanding the needs and contexts of individuals within a web of connections.
Gilligan views the moral self as deeply embedded in specific relationships and historical connections, making it "thick" and particularized. In contrast, Kohlberg advocates for a "thin" moral self that can abstract from these particularities to adopt a totally impersonal standpoint, which he considers the true "moral point of view."
Blum, drawing on Murdoch, argues that understanding another person's needs, interests, and welfare requires moral capacities like care, love, empathy, and emotional sensitivity. It involves seeing the other as a unique individual rather than through the lens of one's own projections, making it a morally significant form of knowledge.
Gilligan portrays the moral agent as connected to the world through pre-existing ties and relationships (e.g., parent, friend), which are not entirely voluntary. This "encumbered self" contrasts with Kohlberg's view of the moral agent as a radically autonomous being who generates moral laws from within their own reason.
Position 1 denies that a care orientation is genuinely distinct from impartialism, asserting that actions based on care are ultimately governed by universalizable principles derived from an impartial viewpoint. Blum criticizes this by arguing that applying such principles in personal relationships requires moral capacities like care and sensitivity to particularities, which are not generated by the principles themselves.
Position 2 claims that while care for others in relationships might be a distinct set of concerns, it is merely personal and lacks genuine moral significance. Blum counters this by arguing that care and responsibility within personal relationships are central to how we understand moral responsibility in those domains and should not be dismissed as solely subjective.
Kohlberg suggests that personal attachments intensify our sense of the dignity of others, which is ultimately grounded in impartialism (a). He also posits that impartialism defines the obligatory aspects of morality, while care in personal relationships is supererogatory, going beyond what is required (b).
Blum argues that if "supererogatory" implies greater merit, then care would be more important than mere obligation. If it means simply "beyond duty," it's implausible to see all care as such, as many caring actions fulfill obligations within relationships. Even if it means "good but not required," relegating it to a less significant domain overlooks the breadth and importance of such actions in human life.
Blum argues that in personal relationships, actions motivated by care express an attitude and emotion considered proper to the relationship, which actions solely based on impartial principles or duty might lack. This emotionally expressive aspect is integral to the moral fabric of personal connections.
3. Essay Questions
Analyze the core differences between Gilligan's care ethics and Kohlberg's justice-based ethics, providing specific examples of how these contrasting perspectives might influence moral decision-making in interpersonal dilemmas.
Critically evaluate Blum's arguments against the impartialist attempts (Positions 1 and 2) to either absorb or dismiss the moral significance of care in personal relationships. Do you find his reasoning persuasive? Why or why not?
Discuss the implications of Gilligan's concept of the "encumbered self" for traditional liberal notions of individual autonomy and moral agency. How might a care-based ethic reshape our understanding of moral responsibility?
Explore the relationship between emotion and reason in moral judgment as presented by Gilligan and Kohlberg. Whose perspective do you find more compelling, and what are the potential strengths and weaknesses of each approach?
Consider Blum's argument that morality may encompass more than just care and impartiality. Identify other potential moral dimensions or values and discuss how they might interact with or be distinct from the perspectives of Gilligan and Kohlberg.
4. Glossary of Key Terms
Impartiality: The principle that moral judgments should be based on objective criteria rather than personal bias or relationships.
Universal Principle: A moral rule or guideline that applies to everyone in relevantly similar situations, without exception.
Care Ethics: An ethical theory that emphasizes the importance of relationships, empathy, compassion, and responsiveness to the needs of others in moral decision-making.
Justice-Based Ethics: An ethical framework that prioritizes fairness, rights, rules, and abstract principles in determining what is morally right. Often associated with Kohlberg's work.
Moral Orientation: A fundamental perspective or approach to understanding and resolving moral issues. Gilligan argues for a care orientation distinct from a justice orientation.
Particularity: The focus on the specific details of individuals, relationships, and situations in moral considerations, rather than abstract principles alone.
Universality: The idea that moral principles or values should be applicable to all people or situations that are relevantly similar.
Encumbered Self: The concept that one's identity and moral obligations are shaped by one's relationships, community ties, and historical context.
Autonomous Self: The concept of an independent, rational individual who is self-governing and can determine moral principles through reason alone.
Supererogatory: Actions that go beyond what is morally required or obligatory; often seen as particularly virtuous or praiseworthy.
5. Timeline of Main Events
Early Work of Lawrence Kohlberg (Pre-1980s): Developed a stage theory of moral development based on principles of justice, impartiality, and universalizability. This work served as the initial context against which Carol Gilligan's ideas emerged.
Early Work of Carol Gilligan (Early 1980s): Began to articulate a "different voice" in moral development, emphasizing care, responsibility within relationships, and a more contextual understanding of moral dilemmas. Her seminal work, In a Different Voice (1982), is a key publication from this period.
Nona Plessner Lyons' Work (1983): Published "Two Perspectives: On Self, Relationships, and Morality," further exploring different moral orientations related to self and relationships, aligning with Gilligan's emerging perspective.
Publication of After Virtue by Alasdair MacIntyre (1984, 2nd ed.): Offered a critique of modern moral philosophy, emphasizing the importance of tradition and virtue, sharing with Gilligan a focus on the situated self, although with different foundations.
Publication of Liberalism and the Limits of Justice by Michael Sandel (1982): Critiqued liberal theories of justice from a communitarian perspective, emphasizing the "encumbered" self and the importance of community, resonating with Gilligan's focus on relationships, though with a broader societal scope.
Lawrence Kohlberg's Later Work (Mid-1980s): In response to Gilligan's critique, Kohlberg attempted to address the role of care in his theory, sometimes suggesting it as an integrated aspect of a mature morality alongside justice, though often maintaining the primacy of justice. His Essays on Moral Development, Vol. 2 (1984) reflects this engagement.
Lawrence Blum's Paper "Gilligan and Kohlberg: Implications for Moral Theory" (October 1986): Originally delivered as a comment on Gilligan's work at the twentieth annual Chapel Hill colloquium. This paper, later published in Ethics (April 1988), systematically analyzes the differences between Gilligan's and Kohlberg's views and defends Gilligan's perspective against potential criticisms from an impartialist standpoint.
Thomas Nagel's The View from Nowhere (1986) and Bernard Williams's Critiques (various works including 1973, 1980, 1985): These philosophers offered critiques of impartialism in ethics from different angles, focusing on the importance of personal integrity and concerns, providing a broader philosophical context for Gilligan's critique, although with distinct focuses.
Publication of "The Emergence of Morality in Young Children" (edited by J. Kagan and S. Lamb, 1988): This volume was slated to include Gilligan's Chapel Hill colloquium paper, further disseminating her ideas.
Recent Neo-Kantian Defenses (Mid-1980s onwards): Philosophers like Barbara Herman, Onora O'Neill, Stephen Darwall, and Marcia Baron offered defenses of neo-Kantian ethics, sometimes attempting to incorporate or set boundaries for considerations of care within a framework prioritizing impartialist principles.
Cast of Characters and Brief Bios:
Carol Gilligan: A moral development psychologist known for her critique of Lawrence Kohlberg's stage theory of moral development. She argued that Kohlberg's model was biased towards a male-centric "justice perspective" and proposed an alternative "care perspective" that emphasizes relationships, responsibility, and context in moral reasoning. Her work, particularly In a Different Voice, has been highly influential in feminist ethics and moral psychology.
Lawrence Kohlberg: A prominent psychologist best known for his theory of stages of moral development, which posits that moral reasoning progresses through universal and hierarchical stages culminating in principled justice. His work focused on abstract principles of right and fairness and provided the dominant framework in moral psychology before Gilligan's critique.
Lawrence A. Blum: The author of the provided article. He is a philosopher who examines the philosophical implications of Gilligan's work for moral theory. He analyzes the key differences between Gilligan's "care ethics" and Kohlberg's "impartialist" approach, defending the moral significance of care and relationships.
Bernard Williams: A highly influential moral philosopher known for his critiques of utilitarianism and Kantianism, emphasizing the importance of personal integrity, historical context, and the limitations of purely impartial moral theories. His work provides a broader philosophical backdrop for some aspects of Gilligan's critique of impartialism.
Thomas Nagel: A contemporary philosopher who has written extensively on ethics, epistemology, and consciousness. While not fully rejecting impartialist morality, he argues for the legitimacy of both personal and impersonal concerns as sources of reasons for action, aligning in part with the criticisms of strict impartialism that underpin Gilligan's work.
Stephen Darwall: A moral philosopher known for his work on impartial reason and contractualism. His ideas on an "impartialist outlook" are referenced by Blum as characterizing Kohlberg's view and the dominant conception in Anglo-American moral philosophy.
Alasdair MacIntyre: A philosopher known for his critique of modern ethics and his advocacy for a virtue-based ethical theory grounded in tradition and community, as presented in After Virtue. His emphasis on the "thick," historically situated self resonates with Gilligan's view of the moral self as embedded in relationships.
Michael Sandel: A political philosopher known for his communitarian critique of liberalism, particularly in Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. He emphasizes the "encumbered" self and the importance of community in shaping identity and moral understanding, ideas that share some common ground with Gilligan's focus on relationships, though at a broader societal level.
Iris Murdoch: A novelist and philosopher whose work, particularly The Sovereignty of Good, emphasizes the importance of moral perception, attention to particularity, and the role of love and understanding in moral life. Blum draws a connection between Murdoch's view and Gilligan's emphasis on understanding the particular other person.
Barbara Herman: A moral philosopher who offers a contemporary interpretation of Kantian ethics, sometimes focusing on the role of desires in generating maxims that are then tested by the categorical imperative. Her work attempts to reconcile Kantian principles with considerations of care and personal relationships.
Onora O'Neill: A philosopher known for her work on Kantian ethics and her analysis of concepts like trust and autonomy. Her work is mentioned in the context of neo-Kantian attempts to define the boundaries between impartialist principles and considerations of care.
Marcia Baron: A moral philosopher who has written on the nature of moral motivation and the alleged repugnance of acting from duty. Her work is relevant to discussions about the relationship between duty, care, and moral worth.
Nona Plessner Lyons: A scholar whose work, specifically "Two Perspectives: On Self, Relationships, and Morality," is cited as contributing to the exploration of moral perspectives beyond a purely impartialist framework, aligning with Gilligan's early work.
George Sher: A philosopher who has explored the relationship between women's psychology and moral theory, potentially offering an impartialist perspective that attempts to accommodate the moral significance of personal relationships.
Michael Walzer: A political philosopher known for his theory of distributive justice based on "spheres of justice," where different goods are distributed according to different principles appropriate to those spheres. His work on different conceptions of fairness is mentioned in a footnote as potentially relevant to understanding non-foundational notions of justice in relation to Gilligan's ideas.
John Rawls: A highly influential political philosopher known for his theory of "justice as fairness," particularly as outlined in A Theory of Justice. His concept of the "original position" is mentioned as an example of a potentially individualistic foundation for justice that Gilligan might critique, although Rawls later argued against this characterization.
Owen Flanagan and Marcia Lind: Philosophers whose comments on an earlier draft of Blum's paper are acknowledged, indicating their engagement with the ideas discussed.
Owen Flanagan and Kathleen Jackson: Authors of "Justice, Care, and Gender: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Debate Revisited," cited in the context of Kohlberg's later views on the psychological dependence of care on justice.
William Lycan: A philosopher whose perspective on care morality as concerned with the evaluation of persons is mentioned.
Michael Stocker: A philosopher whose work on the limits of teleology and the ends of friendship is cited to highlight the importance of emotionally expressive action in personal relationships, something that a purely principle-based morality might overlook.
Stephen Hudson: A philosopher whose critique of the sharp separation between act and motive supports the idea that care morality encompasses more than just inner states.
Annette Baier and Nel Noddings: Contemporary philosophers whose work is mentioned as further exploring the implications of care ethics for moral theory, building upon Gilligan's initial insights.
6. FAQ
1. What is the central difference that Carol Gilligan identifies in moral orientations compared to Lawrence Kohlberg's theory? Gilligan claims there is a distinct moral outlook, often prevalent in women's moral reasoning, that contrasts with Kohlberg's impartialist conception of morality. This "care orientation" emphasizes empathy, responsibility within relationships, and understanding the particular needs of individuals, as opposed to Kohlberg's focus on abstract principles, justice, and universal rules applied impartially.
2. How does Gilligan view the moral self and others in contrast to Kohlberg's perspective? For Gilligan, the moral self is "radically situated and particularized," defined by its specific relationships and historical connections. Similarly, the "other" is seen as a unique individual with specific needs and circumstances. This contrasts with Kohlberg's emphasis on a moral agent abstracting from their particular self to achieve an impersonal standpoint and viewing others primarily as bearers of general moral characteristics.
3. What role do emotions and relationships play in Gilligan's morality of care compared to Kohlberg's emphasis on formal rationality? Gilligan argues that morality necessarily involves an intertwining of emotion, cognition, and action, particularly within the context of relationships. Understanding others' needs and acting morally requires empathy, compassion, and emotional sensitivity. Kohlberg, on the other hand, prioritizes formal rationality in moral reasoning, with emotions playing a secondary role in deriving and motivating moral action.
4. How does Gilligan's concept of "appropriate response" differ from Kohlberg's focus on "right action" based on universal principles? Gilligan rejects the notion that a moral action must be universalizable. Instead, she emphasizes the importance of an "appropriate response" tailored to the specific individuals and context of a relationship. While she acknowledges standards of care and responsibility, her view avoids the strict universalism inherent in Kohlberg's conception of "right action" derived from abstract principles.
5. What are some of the key criticisms or alternative positions that an "impartialist" like Kohlberg might take in response to Gilligan's claims about a distinct care orientation? The source outlines several potential impartialist rejoinders, including: denying the existence of a distinct care orientation, arguing that care concerns are personal rather than moral, claiming care is secondary to or dependent on impartial justice, asserting care is an inferior form of morality due to its lack of universal principles, suggesting care evaluates persons while impartiality evaluates acts, proposing impartiality sets side constraints on care, and arguing that care needs impartial validation.
6. According to the source, why are attempts to reduce care ethics to merely the application of universal principles (Position 1) problematic? The source argues that applying general principles like "Protect one's children from harm" in specific situations requires moral capacities such as sensitivity, attentiveness, and a caring understanding of the particular individuals involved. Knowing when a principle applies and how to apply it effectively in personal relationships depends on this particularized care, which cannot be solely derived from the universal principle itself.
7. How does the source challenge the idea that care in personal relationships is merely "supererogatory" (Position 3b) and thus less significant than impartialist morality? The source contends that categorizing care as supererogatory (going beyond duty) is implausible because many caring actions within personal relationships can be obligatory. Moreover, even if care is seen as morally good but not required, it doesn't necessarily make it less significant than obligatory impartial duties, as the domain of the supererogatory can be vast and crucial in human life.
8. What is the source's overall assessment of the implications of Gilligan's work for moral philosophy? The source concludes that Gilligan's work raises significant questions for moral philosophy by highlighting a distinct moral orientation centered on care and relationships, which is not fully captured by traditional impartialist theories. The discussion of various impartialist responses suggests that accommodating the moral significance of care requires a re-evaluation of fundamental assumptions within contemporary ethics, moving beyond a sole focus on universal principles and impartiality.
7. Table of Contents
00:00:00 - Introduction
Brief introduction to Heliox podcast, describing it as a place "where evidence meets empathy" with independent, moderated conversations on important topics.
00:00:25 - Setting the Stage
Introduction to Lawrence A. Blum's 1988 paper on Gilligan and Kohlberg, explaining how it challenged traditional views of morality.
00:01:20 - Kohlberg's Approach to Morality
Discussion of Kohlberg's emphasis on impartiality, justice, fairness, and logical reasoning in moral development.
00:01:30 - Gilligan's Different Voice
Explanation of Gilligan's research revealing an alternative approach to moral dilemmas that emphasizes care and relationships.
00:01:55 - Seven Key Differences
Breakdown of Blum's analysis highlighting seven key differences between Gilligan's care ethics and Kohlberg's impartialist view.
00:02:02 - The Situated Self
Discussion of how moral choices are made within the context of relationships and life experiences.
00:02:34 - The Particular Other
Explanation of how care ethics focuses on understanding specific individuals rather than applying abstract principles.
00:03:03 - Moral Knowledge as Hard-Won
Discussion of how understanding others' perspectives requires effort and moral skill.
00:03:31 - Connection vs. Independence
Exploration of how our bonds with others shape our moral choices and identity.
00:04:05 - The Role of Emotions
Analysis of how emotions are intertwined with moral reasoning rather than separate from it.
00:04:47 - Beyond Universal Principles
Discussion of how what's morally right might not be universally applicable across all contexts.
00:05:10 - Connection Before Principle
Explanation of how morality springs from connections with others rather than abstract rules.
00:05:48 - Controversy and Debate
Introduction to how these ideas sparked debate in philosophical circles.
00:06:24 - Intermission
Brief pause for reflection and acknowledgment of the podcast's global audience.
00:07:26 - Philosophical Pushback
Analysis of how some philosophers tried to fit care ethics into traditional impartialist frameworks.
00:08:03 - Care as "Supererogatory"
Discussion of the argument that caring is merely "going above and beyond" rather than essential to morality.
00:08:41 - Blum's Counter-Argument
Explanation of how Blum defended the moral significance of care in close relationships.
00:09:52 - Spontaneous Care Actions
Analysis of how many caring actions are instinctive and emotionally driven rather than calculated.
00:10:55 - Challenging the Hierarchy
Discussion of Blum's pushback against attempts to subordinate care ethics to impartialist principles.
00:12:12 - Practical Applications
Reflection on how to apply these philosophical ideas in everyday life.
00:15:03 - Expanding the Circle of Care
Discussion of how care ethics can extend beyond personal relationships to broader social issues.
00:15:22 - Care Ethics for Social Challenges
Analysis of how care ethics might address complex societal problems like climate change and political polarization.
00:16:34 - Care as Active Force
Exploration of how care compels engagement with the world in a compassionate way.
00:16:51 - Personal Reflection
Discussion of how to bring more care into daily life and expand attention to the marginalized.
00:17:43 - Conclusion
Final thoughts on the continuing relevance of these ideas and encouragement for listeners to explore further.
00:18:09 - Closing
Mention of four recurring narratives that underlie every episode and invitation to explore other podcast episodes.
8. Index
Abstract principles, 00:04:47
Care ethics, 00:01:40, 00:05:54, 00:12:20, 00:14:56
Carol Gilligan, 00:01:00, 00:01:23, 00:01:31, 00:02:02, 00:04:47
Connection before principle, 00:05:10
Context matters, 00:02:30
Emotions, 00:04:04, 00:04:13, 00:04:29, 00:04:33, 00:11:48, 00:13:37
Empathy, 00:02:22, 00:03:10, 00:15:03, 00:15:40, 00:16:42
Gilligan's care ethics, 00:01:55, 00:02:34, 00:05:54, 00:10:55
Impartialism, 00:01:00, 00:01:16, 00:01:33, 00:06:09, 00:12:51
Kohlberg, 00:01:00, 00:01:09, 00:01:16, 00:01:20, 00:04:04, 00:07:41, 00:10:49
Lawrence A. Blum, 00:00:25, 00:01:55, 00:08:40, 00:08:48, 00:10:22, 00:11:15
Moral decisions, 00:00:48, 00:03:55, 00:04:13, 00:11:48
Moral development, 00:01:00
Moral knowledge, 00:03:08
Moral skills, 00:02:22
Moral theory, 00:00:25
Morality, 00:00:48, 00:01:09, 00:04:47, 00:06:26, 00:08:03, 00:08:19, 00:08:48, 00:08:55
Particular other, 00:02:34
Relationships, 00:02:03, 00:02:46, 00:02:59, 00:03:31, 00:03:52, 00:05:14, 00:05:30, 00:08:48, 00:08:55, 00:10:15, 00:10:30, 00:11:27, 00:12:01, 00:12:51, 00:13:34
Situated self, 00:01:56, 00:02:02
Supererogatory, 00:08:14, 00:09:52
Universal principles, 00:04:47, 00:10:49
Universal rules, 00:00:48, 00:01:16, 00:01:20, 00:03:52, 00:05:25, 00:08:19, 00:11:06
9. Poll
10. Post-Episode Fact Check
The content of this episode appears factually accurate regarding the philosophical positions discussed. The podcast correctly represents:
Lawrence Kohlberg's emphasis on impartiality, justice, and universal rules in moral development
Carol Gilligan's critique and alternative "ethics of care" approach
Lawrence A. Blum's 1988 paper analyzing the implications of Gilligan's work for moral theory
The key differences between care ethics and impartialist approaches, including:
The importance of the situated self
Focus on particular others rather than abstract principles
The role of emotions in moral reasoning
The value of relationships and connections
The challenge to purely universal principles
The transcript accurately represents the academic discourse around moral development theories from this period. The presenters correctly identify the tensions between these approaches and the attempts to reconcile or subordinate care ethics within impartialist frameworks.
11. Image (3000 x 3000 pixels)
